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XTopic IV.
What regulations should be made in regard to the sup-
plying of fuel or oil to belligerent vessels in neutral ports ?
CONCLUSION.
The supply of fuel or oil within a neutral port to ves-
sels in belligerent service in no case shall exceed what is
necessary to make the total amount on board sufficient to
reach the nearest unblockaded port of the belligerent ves-
sel's own state or some nearer named destination.
The supply may be subject to such other regulations as
the neutral may deem expedient.
DISCUSSION AND NOTES.
Early ideas of neutral obligations.—-Grotius, writing in
J.G25. in his brief reference to neutrality, lays down the
principle that
—
It is the duty of those who have no part in the war to do
nothing which may favor the party having* an unjust cause, or
which may hinder the action of the one waging a just war,
* * * and in a case of doubt to treat both belligerents alike,
in permitting transit, in furnishing provisions to the troops, in
refraining from assisting the besieged. (De Jure Belli ac Pacis,
Lib.sIII. C. XVI, iii, 1.)
Gustavus Adolphus said to George Frederick, Elector
of Brandenburg:
What sort of a thing is that—neutrality? I do not understand
it. There is no such thing.
This shows only the beginning of the idea of neutrality,
which was hardly regarded as a theoretical possibility in
the seventeenth century. Gradually the idea became clear.
Tn 1737 .Bynlvershoek gave the clue to the correct principle
when he departed from the idea of impartiality and
enunciated the principle of absence of participation by
the neutral in the hostilities. He said
:
I call those non hostes who are of neither party.
(66)
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In 1793 the attempt of M. Genet to fit out privateers
in the United States, supposed to be neutral in the war
between France and Great Britain, showed the United
States the folly of a treaty which might place the state in
a doubtful position in time of Avar.
Neutrality in the sense in which it is now understood is
largely a doctrine of the nineteenth century, and many of
the ideas now coirimonly advanced date from about the
middle of that century. Ortolan, writing at about this
time, says
:
In default of treaty stipulations neutral ports and waters are
an asylum open to the ships of the belligerent, especially if they
appear in limited numbers ; they are admitted to procure neces-
sary provisions, and to make repairs which are essential to
enable them again to put to sea and resume the operations of
war, without any violations of its duties on the part of the
neutral state.
Growing recognition of neutral obligations.—The decla-
ration of Paris of 1856 did not clear up such points as are
involved in supplying fuel to a belligerent vessel in a
neutral port. Gradually circumstances, particularly the
introduction of steam vessels, forced neutral states to make
regulations in regard to the use of their ports by bel-
ligerent vessels. Neutral states had come to recognize
that they had the right of control over belligerent vessels
in their ports, and if they had the right they were begin-
ning to realize that it carried a corresponding obligation.
During the civil war in the United States the foreign
nations began to emphasize the rule of twenty-four hour
sojourn for belligerent ships in neutral ports. The procla-
mation of President Grant during the Franco-Prussian
war in 1870 speaks of the "respective rights and obliga-
tions of the belligerent parties and of the citizens of the
United States.-' and of the possibility "that armed cruisers
of the belligerents may be tempted to abuse the hospitality
accorded to them in the ports" of the United States. It
then prescribes with much detail what may not be done by
a belligerent vessel in United States ports. (This procla-
i
mation and references to precedents and opinions may be
found in International Law Situations. Naval War Col-
lege, 1904. pp. 63-78.) The decision and award on the
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Alabama claims still further defined neutral rights and
obligations. After citing decisions, etc., in regard to con-
trol of belligerent vessels in neutral ports, it is said in
the Discussions of International Law Situations in 1904
that—
Thus it is seen that the decision of the courts, proclamations,
domestic laws, and regulations alike agree upon the growing
tendency to prescribe more and more definitely the exact range
of action which may be permitted to a belligerent war vessel in
a neutral port. In no case is there a doubt that the neutral
state has a right to make regulations upon this subject. The
proclamations of neutrality issued in recent wars also show a
tendency to become explicit in outlining belligerent rights in
neutral ports. This has been particularly the case since the
civil war in the United States and the adjustment of the Alabama
claims. (P. 71.)
In the first year of the United States civil war the
tendency was toward a somewhat liberal policy in regard
to the supply of coal. In 1862, however, Lord John Rus-
sell limited the amount of coal to be supplied to belliger-
ent vessels in British ports to so much only "as may be
sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her
own country, or to some nearer destination." The British
proclamations of 1870, 1885, and 1898 were in the same
words. That of February 10, 1904, made the last clause
to read "or to some nearer named neutral destination."
In the case of the Burton and Pinkerton (Court of Ex-
chequer, June 4, 1867, 2 Law Reports, 340) the headnote
states that
—
To serve on board a vessel used as a storeship in aid of a bel-
ligerent, the fitting out of which to be so used is an offense
within the 59 Geo. 3, c. 69, is a serving on board a vessel for a
warlike purpose in aid of a foreign state within s. 2 of that act.
The United States proclamation of 1870 stated that the
authorities were to require belligerent vessels to put to sea
"as soon as possible after the expiration of such period of
twenty-four hours, without permitting her to take in sup-
plies beyond what may be necessary for her immediate
use." The same words were used in the proclamation of
February 11, 1904.
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Recognition of neutral obligations in the Geneva arbiz
tration.—The decision of the Geneva tribunal maintained
that
—
in order to impart to any supplies of coal a character inconsistent
with the second rule, prohibiting the use of neutral ports or
waters, as a base of naval operations for a belligerent, it is
necessary that the said supplies should be connected with special
circumstances of time, of persons, or of place, which may com-
bine to give them such character. (4 Papers Eelating to the
Treaty of Washington, p. 50.)
In the opinion of Count Sclopis before the Geneva arbi-
tration the question of the supply of coal was raised. He
said
:
I can only treat the question of the supply and shipment of
coal as connected with the use of a base of naval operations
directed against one of the belligerents, or a flagrant case of
contraband of war..—
I will not say that the simple fact of having allowed a greater
amount of coal than was necessary to enable a vessel to reach
the nearest port of its country constitutes in itself a sufficient
grievance to call for an indemnity. As the Lord Chancellor of
England said on the 12th of June, 1871, in the House of Lords,
England and the United States equally hold the principle that
it is no violation of international law to furnish arms to a bel-
ligerent. But if an excessive supply of coal is connected with
other circumstances which show that it was used as a veritable
res hostilis then there is an infringement on the second rule of
Article VI of the treaty. (4 Papers Relating to the Treaty of
Washington, p. 74.)
Mr. Adams argues as follows:
This question of coals was little considered by writers on the
law of nations and by sovereign powers until the present century.
It has become one of the first importance, now that the motive
power of all vessels is so greatly enhanced by it.
The effect of this application of steam power has changed the
character of war on the ocean, and invested with a greatly pre-
ponderant force those nations which possess most largely the
best material for it within their own territories and the greatest
number of maritime places over the globe where deposits may be
conveniently provided for their use.
It is needless to point out the superiority in this respect of the
position of Great Britain. There seems no way of discussing the
question other than through this example.
Just in proportion to these advantages is the responsibilty of
that country when holding the situation of a neutral in time of
war.
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The safest course in any critical emergency would be to deny
altogether to supply the vessels of any of the belligerents, except
perhaps in positive distress.
But such a policy would not fail to be regarded as selfish, illib-
eral, and unkind by all belligerents. It would inevitably lead
to the acquisition and establishment of similar positions for
themselves by other maritime powers, to be guarded with equal
exclusiveness, and entailing upon them enormous and continual
expenses to provide against rare emergencies.
It is not therefore either just or in the interest of other powers,
by exacting severe responsibilities of Great Britain in time of
war, to force her either to deny all supplies or, as a lighter risk,
to engage herself in war.
It is in this sense that I approach the arguments that have
been presented in regard to the supply of coals given by Great
Britain to the insurgent American steamers as forming a base
of operations.
It must be noted that, throughout the war of four years,
supplies of coal were furnished liberally at first and more scantily
afterwards, but still indiscriminately, to both belligerents.
The difficulty is obvious how to distinguish those cases of
coals, given to either of the parties as helping them impartially
to other ports, from those furnished as a base of hostile
operations.
Unquestionably, Commo^qre^jXIlkes, in the VanderMlt, was very ->7
much aided in continuing his cruise at sea by the supplies ob-
tained from British sources. Is this to be construed as getting
a base of operations?
It is plain that a line must be drawn somewhere, or else no
neutral power will consent to furnish supplies to any belligerent
whatever in time of war.
So far as I am able to find my way out of this dilemma, it is
in this wise
:
The supply of coals to a belligerent involves no responsibility
to the neutral, when it is made in response to a demand pre-
sented in good faith, with a single object of satisfying a legiti-
mate purpose openly assigned.
On the other hand, the same supply does involve a responsibil-
ity if it shall in any way be made to appear that the concession
was made, either tacitly or by agreement, with a view to promote
or complete the execution of a hostile act.
Hence I perceive no other way to determine the degree of the
responsibility of a neutral in these cases than by an examination
of the evidence to show the intent of the grant in any specific
case. Fraud or falsehood in such a case poisons everything it
touches. Even indifference may degenerate into willful negli-
gence, and that will impose a burden of proof to excuse it before
responsibility can be relieved.
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This is the rule I have endeavored to apply in judging the
nature of the cases complained of in the course of arbitration.
(Ibid, p. 148.)
Sir Alexander Cockburn presented the British views, as
follows
:
But a novel and, to my mind, most extraordinary proposition
is now put forward, namely, that if a belligerent ship is allowed
to take coal, and then to go on its business as a ship of war, this
is to make the port from which the coal is procured " a base of
naval operations," so as to come within the prohibition of the
second rule of the treaty of Washington.
We have here another instance of an attempt to force the
words of the treaty to a meaning which they were never—at
least so far as one of the contracting parties is concerned
—
intended to bear. It would be absurd to suppose that the British
Government, in assenting to the rule as laid down, intended to
admit that whenever a ship of war had taken in coal at a British
port, aud then gone to sea again as a war vessel, a liability for
all the mischief done by her should ensue. Nor can I believe the
United States Government had any such arriere pensee in fram-
ing the rule ; as, if such had been the case, it is impossible to
suppose that they woiild not have distinctly informed the British
Government of the extended application they propose to give to
the rule.
The rule of international law, that a belligerent shall not make
neutral territory the base of hostile operations, is founded on
the principle that the neutral territory is inviolable by the bel-
ligerent, and that it is the duty of the neutral not to allow his ter-
ritory to be used by one belligerent as a starting point for opera-
tions against the other. This is nowhere better explained, as
regards ships of war, than by M. Ortolan, in the following
passage
:
" Le principe general de l'inviolabilite du territoire neutre
exige aussi que l'emploi de ce territoire reste franc de toute
mesure ou moyen de guerre de l'un des belligerants contre l'autre.
C'est une obligation pour chacun des belligerants de s'en abste-
nir ; c'est aussi un devoir pour l'etat neutre d'exiger cette absten-
tion ; et c'est aussi pour lui un devoir d'y veiller et d'en maintenir
l'observation a l'encontre de qui que ce soit. Ainsi il appartient
a l'autorite qui commande dans les lieux neutres, ou des navires
belligerants, soit de guerre, soit de commerce, ont ete recus de
prendre des mesures necessaires pour que l'asile accorde ne
tourne pas en machination hostile contre l'un des belligerants
;
pour empecher specialement qu'il ne devienne un lieu d'ou les
batiments de guerre ou les corsaires surveillent les navires enne-
mis pour les poursuivre et les combattre, et les capturer lorsqu'ils
seront parvenus au-dela de la mer territoriale. Une de ces
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mesures consiste a empecher la sortie simultanee des navires
appartenant a des puissances ennemies l'une de l'autre."
It must be, I think, plain that the words " base of operations "
must be accepted in their ordinary and accustomed sense, as they
have hitherto been understood, both in common parlance and
among authors who have written on international law. Now,
the term " base of warlike operations " is a military term, aud
has a well-known sense. It signifies a local position which serves
as a point of departure and return in military operations, and
with which a constant connection and communication can be kept
up, and which may be fallen back upon whenever necessary. In
naval warfare it would mean something analogous—a port or
water from which a fleet or a ship of war might watch the enemy
and sally forth to attack him, with the possibility of falling back
upon the port or water in question, for fresh supplies, or shelter,
or a renewal of operations. (Ibid, p. 422.)
Proclamations in regard to use of neutral ports.—The
Kussian declaration of April 20 (May 2), 1898, during
the Spanish-American war stated
—
The Imperial Government further declares that the ships of
war of the two belligerent powers may only enter Russian ports
for twenty-four hours. In case of stress of weather, absence of
goods or provisions necessary to the maintenance of the crew, or
for indispensable repairs, the prolongation of the above-men-
tioned time can only be accorded by special authorization of the
Imperial Government. (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1898, p. 897.)
One of the most detailed prescriptions in regard to the
treatment of belligerent ships in neutral ports is contained
in the Brazilian proclamation of April 29, 1898, which
was reaffirmed in 1904
:
VII.
Privateers, although they do not conduct prizes, shall not be
admitted to the ports of the Republic for more than twenty-four
hours, except in cases indicated in the preceding section.
VIII.
No ship with the flag of one of the belligerents, employed in
the war, or destined for the same, may be provisioned, equipped,
or armed in the ports of the Republic, the furnishing of victuals
and naval stores which it may absolutely need and the things
indispensable for the continuation of its voyage not being in-
cluded in the prohibition.
IX.
The last provision of the preceding section presupposes that
the ship is bound for a certain port, and that it is only en route
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and puts into a porfc of the Republic through stress of circum-
stances. This, moreover, will not be considered as verified if
the same ship tries the same port repeated times, or after having
been relieved in one port should subsequently enter another,
under the same pretext, except in proven cases of compelling
circumstances. Therefore, repeated visits without a sufficiently
justified motive would authorize the suspicion that the ship is
not really en route, but is frequenting the seas near Brazil in
order to make prizes of hostile ships. In such cases asylum or
succor given to a ship would be characterized as assistance or
favor against the other belligerent, being thus a breach of
neutrality.
Therefore, a ship which shall once have entered one of our ports
shall not be received in that or another shortly after having left
the first, in order to take victuals, naval stores, or make repairs,
except in a duly proved case of compelling circumstances, unless
after a reasonable interval which would make it seem probable
that the ship had left the coast of Brazil and had returned after
having finished the voyage she was undertaking.
X.
The movements of the belligerent will be under the supervi-
sion of the custom authorities from the time of entrance until
the departure, for the purpose of verifying the proper character
of the things put on board.
XI.
The ships of belligerents shall take material for combustion
only for the continuance of their voyage.
Furnishing coal to ships which sail the seas near Brazil for
the purpose of making prizes of an enemy's vessels or prosecu-
ting any other kind of hostile operations is prohibited.
A ship which shall have once received material for combustion
in our ports shall not be allowed a new supply there, unless there
shall have elapsed a reasonable interval which makes -it probable
that said ship has returned after having finished its voyage to a
foreign port.
XII.
It will not be permitted to either of the belligerents to re-
ceive in the ports of the Republic goods coming directly for
them in the ships of any nation whatever.
This means that the belligerents may not seek ports en route
and on account of an unforseen necessity, while having the in-
tention of remaining in the vicinity of the coasts of Brazil,
taking thus beforehand the necessary precautions to furnish
themselves with the means of continuing their enterprises.
The tolerance of such an abuse would be equivalent to allowing
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our ports to stive as a base of operations for the belligerents.
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1898, p. 847.)
The Belgian royal decree of February 18, 1901, gives
quite full statement of its policy
:
Art. XIII. In no case shall vessels of war or privateers of a
nation engaged in a maritime war be furnished with supplies or
means of repairs in excess of what is indispensable to reach the
nearest port of their country, or of a nation allied to theirs in
the war. The same vessel may not, unless specially authorized,
be provided with coal a second time until the expiration of three
months after a first coaling in a Belgian port.
Art. XIV. The vessels specified in the preceding article may
not, with the aid of supplies taken in Belgian territory, increase
in any way their war material nor strengthen their crews, nor
make enlistments even among their own countrymen, nor exe-
cute, under the pretext of repairs, works of a nature to augment
their military efficiency, nor land for the purpose of forwarding
to their homes, by land routes, men, sailors, or soldiers happen-
ing to be on board.
Art. XV. They must abstain from any act intended to con-
vert their place of refuge into a base of operation in any way
whatever against their enemies, and also from any investigation
into the resources, forces, or location of their enemies.
Other proclamations vary in stringency. The Danish,
proclamation of April 27, 1904, states:
So much coal only may be taken in as may be necessary to
carry such vessels to the nearest nonblockaded home port, or,
with permission from the proper Danish authorities, to some
other neutral destination. No ship will be permitted, without
special authorization, to coal in any Danish harbor or roadstead
more than once in the course of three months. (Foreign Re-
lations, U. S., 1904, par. 2, sec. 2, p. 22.)
The Danish proclamation of April 27, 1904, also pro-
vides :
The belligerents are not permitted to maintain coal depots on
Danish territory. It is forbidden to clear from Danish harbors
cargoes of coal directly destined for the fleets of the belligerents.
This injunction does not, however, apply to coal brought from a
harbor to the outlying roadstead intended to be used in com-
pliance with the above provisions of paragraph 2, section 2.
(Par. 5.)
The Norwegian neutrality decree of April 30, 1904, con-
tains practically the same provisions in regard to coaling.
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The Egyptian proclamation of February 12, 1901:. re-
quires from the commander a written statement of the
destination of the ship and of the amount of coal on board.
The United States proclamation of February 11, 1904,
prescribesThat—~~
No ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall be per-
mitted, while in any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters within
the jurisdiction of the United States, to take in any supplies
except provisions and such other things as may be requisite for
the subsistence of her crew, and except so much coal only as may
be sufficient to carry such vessel, if without any sail power, to
the nearest port of her own countrj' ; or in case the vessel is
rigged to go under sail, and may also be propelled by steam
power, then with half the quantity of coal which she would be
entitled to receive, if dependent upon steam alone, and no coal
shall be again supplied to any such ship of war or privateer in
the same or any other port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the
United States, without special permission, until after the ex-
piration of three months from the time when such coal majr have
been last supplied to her within the waters of the United States,
unless such ship of war or privateer shall, since last thus sup-
plied, have entered a port of the government to which she be-
longs. (Foreign Eelations, U. S., 1904, p. 34.)
The proclamation of Sweden and Norway, April 30,
1904, provides as to belligerent vessels, that
—
They are forbidden to obtain any supplies except stores, pro-
visions, and means for repairs necessary for the subsistence of
the crew or for the security of navigation. In regard to coal,
they can only purchase the necessary quantity to reach the nearest
nonblockaded national port, or, with the consent of the authori-
ties of the King, a neutral destination. Without special per-
mission the same vessel will not be permitted to again purchase
coal in a port or roadstead of Sweden or Norway within three
months after the last purchase. (Foreign Eelations, U. S., 1904,
p. 31.)
It is also forbidden "the belligerent powers to establish
coal depots on Swedish or Norwegian soil."
Policy and practice of Great Britain.—Hall says:
Even during the American civil war ships of war were only
permitted to be furnished with so much coal in English ports as
might be sufficient to take them to the nearest port of their own
country, and were not allowed to receive a second supply in the
same or any other port, without special permission, until after
the expiration of three months from the date of receiving such
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coal. The regulations of the United States in 1870 were similar
;
no second supply being permitted for three months unless the
vessel requesting it had put into a European port in the interval.
There can be little doubt that no neutral states would now ven-
ture to fall below this measure of care ; and there can be as little
doubt that their conduct will be as right as it will be prudent.
When vessels were at the mercy of the winds it was not possible
to measure with accuracy the supplies which might be furnished
to them, and as blockades were seldom continuously effective,
and the nations which carried on distant naval operations were
all provided with colonies, questions could hardly spring from
the use of foreign possessions as a source of supplies. Under the
altered conditions of warfare matters are changed. When sup-
plies can be meted out in accordance with the necessities of the
case, to permit more to be obtained than can, in a reasonably
liberal sense of the word, be called necessary for reaching a place
of safety, is to provide the belligerent with means of aggressive
action ; and consequently to violate the essential principles of
neutrality. (International Law, 5th ed., p. 606.)
In the time of war it is generally accepted that mer-
chants of a neutral state will sell to the belligerents articles
that are regarded as contraband and that neutral vessels
will carry such goods. The goods are of course liable to
seizure and the vessels may suffer consequences in propor-
tion to their guilt if they come within the power of the
belligerent. Of late years there has been a growing at-
tempt on the part of the neutral states to prevent subjects
from engaging in contraband trade. The regulations in
regard to this matter are not all equally stringent. The





And we hereby further warn and admonish all our loving sub-
jects, and all persons whatsoever entitled to our protection, to
observe toward each of the aforesaid powers, their subjects, citi-
zens, and territories, and toward all belligerents whatsoever with
whom we are at peace, the duties of neutrality ; and to respect,
in all and each of them, the exercise of belligerent rights.
And we hereby further warn all our loving subjects, and all
persons whatsoever entitled to our protection, that if any of them
shall presume, in contempt of this our royal proclamation, and of
our high displeasure, to do any acts in derogation of their duty
as subjects of a neutral power in a war between other powers, or
in violation or contravention of the law of nations in that behalf,
as more especially by breaking or endeavoring to break any
blockade lawfully and actually established by or on behalf of
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either of the said powers, or by carrying- officers, soldiers, dis-
patches, arms, ammunition, military stores or materials, or any
article or articles considered and deemed to be contraband of
war according to the law or modern usages of nations, for the
use or service of either of the said powers, that all persons so
offending", together with their ships and goods, will rightfully
incur and be justly liable to hostile capture and to the penalties
denounced by the law of nations in that behalf.
And we do hereby give notice that all our subjects and persons
entitled to our protection who may misconduct themselves in the
premises will do so at their peril, and of their own wrong; and
they will in nowise obtain any protection from us against such
capture or such penalties as aforesaid, but will, on the contrary,
incur our high displeasure by such misconduct.
The British proclamation of neutrality in 1904 further
prohibits the use by the belligerents of any waters subject
to the territorial jurisdiction of the British Crown, as a
station or place of resort for any warlike purpose, or for
the purpose of obtaining any facilities for warlike equip-
ment.
Provision is also made that a belligerent vessel may not
"take in supplies beyond what may be necessary for her
immediate use." A belligerent vessel is not permitted
within British waters "to take in any supplies except pro-
visions and such other things as may be requisite for the
subsistence of her crew, and except so much coal only as
may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port
of her own country, or to some nearer named neutral
destination." No further supply of coal within British
jurisdiction is allowed till after three months without
special permission.
The full statement in regard to the supply of coal is
contained in Rule 3 of the proclamation, and is as follows
:
Eule 3. No ship of war of either belligerent shall hereafter be
permitted, while in any such port, roadstead, or waters subject
to the territorial jurisdiction of His Majesty, to take in any sup-
plies, except provisions and such other things as may be requisite
for the subsistence of her crew, and except so much coal only as
may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her
own country, or to some nearer named neutral destination., and
no coal shall again be supplied to any such ship of war in the
same or any other port, roadstead, or waters subject to the terri-
torial jurisdiction of His Majesty, without special permission,
until after the expiration of three months from the time when
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such coal may have been last supplied to her within British
waters as aforesaid.
This rule received a new interpretation by the procla-
mation of the governor <>l Malta issued on August 12,
1904. This proclamation states that
—
Whereas in giving the said order we were guided by the prin-
ciple that belligerent ships of war are admitted into neutral
ports in view of exigencies of life at sea and the hospitality
which it is customary to extend to vessels of friendly powers
;
And whereas this principle does not extend to enable belliger-
ent ships of war to utilize neutral ports directly for the purpose
of hostile operations
;
We, therefore, in the name of His Majesty, order and direct
that the above-quoted rule No. 3, published by proclamation No.
1 of the 12th February, 1904, inasmuch as it refers to the ex-
tent of coal which may be supplied to belligerent ships of war in
British ports during the present war, shall not be understood as
having any application in case of a belligerent fleet proceeding
either to the seat of war or to any position or positions on the
line of route with the object of intercepting neutral ships on
suspicion of carrying contraband of war, and that such fleet shall
not be permitted to make use in any way of any port, roadstead,
or waters subject to the jurisdiction of His Majesty for the pur-
pose of coaling, either directly from the shore or from colliers
accompanying such fleet, whether vessels of such fleet present
themselves to any such port or roadstead or within the said
waters at the same time or successively, and second, that the
same practice shall be pursued with reference to single bellig-
erent ships of war proceeding for purpose of belligerent opera-
tions as above denned
;
provided that this is not to be applied to
the case of vessels putting in on account of actual distress at
sea, in which case the provision of rule No. 3 as published by
proclamation No. 1 of the 12th February, 1904, shall be applicable.
It will be observed that this proclamation specifically
announces the principle "that belligerent ships of war
are admitted into neutral ports in view of exigencies of
life at sea and the hospitality which it is customary to
extend to vessels of friendly powers;" and that "this
principle does not extend to enable belligerent ships of
war to utilize neutral ports directly for the purpose of
hostile operations." It is not the intention to extend hos-
pitality to belligerent vessels proceeding to the seat of
war or advancing for the purpose of belligerent opera-
tions, whether against other belligerents or against neu-
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trals carrying contraband or otherwise involved in the
war. In short, the doctrine would seem to involve the
privilege of coaling for navigation to a home port, but no
such privilege in order to reach the area of warfare or for
direct hostile operations. This position taken by Great
Britain is an advanced one. As was said in the discus-
sions of this Naval War College in 11*05 (Topic IX,
p. 158) :
It can not reasonably be expected that a neutral power will
\
permit its own ports to be used as sources of supplies and coal,
using which the belligerent vessel or fleet may set forth to seize
the same neutral's commerce or interrupt its trade.
Professor Holland raises the question of supply of coal
to a belligerent ship and briefly summarizes the British
practice' as follows:
May she also replenish her stock of coal? To ask this question
may obviously, under modern conditions and under certain cir-
cumstances, be equivalent to asking whether belligerent ships may
receive in neutral harbors what will enable them to seek out
their enemy, and to maneuver while attacking him. It was
first raised during the American civil war, in the first year of
which the Duke of Newcastle instructed colonial governors that
"with respect to the supplying in British jurisdiction of articles
ancipitis usus (such, for instance, as coal), there is no ground
for any interference whatever on the part' of colonial authori-
ties." But, by the following year, the question had been more
maturely considered, and Lord John Russell directed, on January
31, 1862, that the ships of war of eiffiier belligerent should be
supplied with "so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry
such vessel to the nearest port of her own country, or to some
nearer destination." Identical language was employed by Great
Britain in 1870, 1885, and 1898, but in the British instructions of
February 10, 1904, the last phrase was strengthened so as to
run : "Or to some nearer named neutral destination." The
Egyptian proclamation of February 12, 1904, superadds the re-
quirement of a written declaration by the belligerent com-
mander as to the destination of his ship and the quantity of coal
remaining on board of her, and Mr. Balfour, on July 11, informed
the House of Commons that "directions had been given for re-
quiring an engagement that any belligerent man-of-war, sup-
plied with coal to carry her to the nearest port of her own
nation, would in fact proceed to that port direct." Finally, a
still stronger step was taken by the Government of this country,
necessitated by the hostile advance toward eastern waters of the
Russian Pacific squadron. Instructions were issued to all Brit-
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ish ports, on August 8, which, reciting that "belligerent ships of
war are admitted into neutral ports in view of the exigencies of
life at sea, and the hospitality which is customary to extend to
vessels of friendly powers ; but the principle does not extend to
enable belligerent ships of war to utilize neutral ports directly
for the purpose of hostile operations," goes on to direct that the
rule previously promulgated, "inasmuch as it refers to the ex-
tent of coal which may be supplied to belligerent ships of war in
British ports during the present war, shall not be understood as
having any application to the case of a belligerent fleet proceed-
ing either to the seat of war, or to any position or positions on
the line of route, with the object of intercepting neutral ships
on suspicion of carrying contraband of war, and that such fleets
shall not be permitted to make use, in any way, of any port,
roadstead, or waters, subject to the jurisdiction of His Majesty,
for the purpose of coaling either directly from the shore or
from colliers accompanying such fleet, whether vessels of such
fleet present themselves to such port or roadstead, or within the
said waters, at the same time or successively ; and that the same
practice shall be pursued with reference to single belligerent
ships of war proceeding for the purpose of belligerent opera-
tions, as above denned, provided that this is not to be applied
to the case of vessels putting in on account of actual distress at
sea. (See Parliamentary Paper, Russia, Xo. 1 (1905), p. 15, and
Malta Government Gazette of August 12, 1904. 83 Fortnightly
Review, 1905, p. 795.)
Professor Lawrence says
:
Lord Lansdowne voiced the usual British doctrine with admi-
rable clearness, when he wrote in February last to a Cardiff
firm : "Coal is an article ancipitis usus not per se contraband of
war; but, if destined for warlike as opposed to industrial use,
it may become contraband." Can we hold this position, and yet
press for the placing of coal on the same footing as ammuni-
tion, so far as belligerent men-of-war visiting our territoral
waters are concerned? No doubt we should be told that if such
ships are no longer to be allowed to buy coal in our ports, we
can hardly claim for our merchantmen the right to carry it
to their ports unmolested, as long as they are not ports of naval
equipment. And yet this argument does not seem conclusive.
An article of commerce may be so essential for hostile purposes
that no warship ought to be supplied with it in neutral water,
and yet so essential for the ordinary purposes of civil life that
it ought not to be prevented from reaching the peaceful inhabi-
tants of belligerent countries. The two propositions are not
consistent. If both are upheld in reference to coal, we can work
for the abolition of the present liberty to supply it to combatant
vessels when visiting neutral ports and harbors, and at the same
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time maintain that when it is sent abroad in the way of ordinary
trade, belligerents must treat it as conditionally and not abso-
lutely contraband. But at present, as we have seen (see pp. 129-
132), there can be no question of complete prohibition. All we
can hope to gain is a rule which will deny coal in future to war
vessels when they have broken the conditions on which neutrals
allowed them to take a supply. Such an advance in strictness
would in no way conflict with our existing doctrine that coal is
properly placed among goods conditionally contraband. (War
and Neutrality in the Far East, 2d ed., p. 160.)
Policy and practice of France.—The French policy as
a neutral has been in general to place little restriction
upon the entrance or sojourn of belligerent vessels within
its ports. It has been maintained by some French writers
that it is entirely proper for a belligerent vessel pursued
by its enemy to seek refuge in a neutral port.
If the enemy wishes to reduce them to a 'state of impotence, it
is for him to take the necessary measures to make it dangerous
for them to leave. ( Dupuis, 181 North American Keview, p. 182.)
The doctrine that belligerent vessels may stay in a
neutral port in order to obtain "fresh means of naviga-
tion," but not to make "any increase of fighting strength,"
is one which easily leads to abuse. It is exceedingly dif-
ficult to distinguish between the military effects of "fresh
means of navigation," 'as coal, and a definite "increase in
fighting strength." One might be of as great advantage
as the other in actual war.
Even the supplementary observations issued by the
French minister of marine in February, 1904, contain
such provisions as follows:
En aucun cas, un belligerant ne peut faire usage d'un port
frangais ou appartenant a un Etat protege dans un but de guerre,
ou pour s'y approvisionner d'armes ou de munitions de guerre, ou
pour y execnter, sous pretexte de reparations, des travaux ayant
pour but d'augmenter sa puissance militaire
:
II ne pent etre fourni a un belligerant que les vivres, denrees,
approvisionnements et moyens de reparations necessaires a la
subsistance de son equipage a la securite de sa navigation.
These clauses and others define more clearly than here-
tofore the position of France.
The French regulations in regard to neutrality of Feb-
ruary 13, 1904, were identical with those issued on April
18949 6 v
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27, L898, during the Spanish-American war, and can not
be said to have been issued with the intention of giving
to Russia any especially favorable treatment. The regu-
lations are, however, much less stringent and explicit than
those issued by the United States and Great Britain. The
French declaration is as follows:
The Government of the Republic declares and notifies whomso-
ever it may concern that it has decided to observe a strict neu-
trality in the war which has just broken out between Spain and
the United States.
It considers it to be its duty to remind Frenchmen residing in
France, in the colonies and protectorates, and abroad that they
must refrain from all acts which, committed in violation of
French or international law, could be considered as hostile to
one of the parties or as contrary to a scrupulous neutrality.
They are particularly forbidden to enroll themselves or to take
service either in the army on land or on board the ships of war of
one or the other of the belligerents, or to contribute to the
equipment or armament of a ship of war.
The Government decides, in addition, that no ship of war of
either belligerent will be permitted to enter and to remain with
her prizes in the harbors and anchorages of France, its colonies
and protectorates, for more than twenty-four hours, except in
the case of forced delay or justifiable necessity.
No sale of objects gained from prizes shall take place in the
said harbors and anchorages.
Any person disobeying the above restrictions can have no
claim to the protection of the Government or its agents against
the acts or measures which the belligerents might exercise or
decree in accordance with the rules of international law, and
such persons will be prosecuted, should there be cause, according
to the laws of the Republic. (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1898, p.
862.)
It will be observed that no reference is made to the
taking of coal in French ports nor to the length of sojourn
of a belligerent vessel in a French port except when ac-
companied by prize, when the stay is limited to twenty-
four hours. The general custom is to limit the stay~6f a
belligerent vessel to twenty-four hours and to prohibit
absolutely the entrance of a vessel with prize.
Professor .Lawrence, comparing the French rules with
others, and speaking of the British position, says:
But, taken at their best, French rules require strengthening
;
and the question for us to consider is whether a further advance
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on our part would be more likely to bring our neighbor into line
with us, or confirm her in her present position. No doubt our
interests would be served by complete prohibition, if it could be
made general ; and for this reason other states may decline to
follow any lead we may give. As we are better off for coaling
stations than any other power, and have greater facilities for
keeping our fleets supplied by colliers, we could not fail to benefit
by a change which would make men-of-war dependent upon coal
obtained in their own ports or from their own supply ships. On
the other hand, we have more to lose than most states by the
present system. Our sea-borne trade is so enormous and so
essential to our welfare that an enemy could. do vast damage by
means of two or three swift and well-handled commerce de-
stroyers, which might for a time obtain coal in neutral ports,
though we had succeeded in closing all their own against them.
Our neighbors are well aware of this ; and they know, in addi-
tion, that the change, if made, would either greatly restrict their
operations at sea, or lay upon them the necessity of acquiring
distant coaling stations. (War and Neutrality in the Far East,
2d ed., p. 130.)
In Le Temps, Paris, of May 10 and 11, 1905, there
are quite full statements of the positions taken by Japan
and France in regard to the hospitality extended to the
Russian fleet under Admiral Rojestvensky in French
ports, the Japanese maintaining that the assistance had
been of such character as to violate neutral obligations.
While not questioning the good faith of France, the
Japanese maintain that the execution of the orders of the
Government has not been effective. From this fact the
journey of the Russian fleet has been greatly facilitated
and this is a reason for complaint, as it was regarded as
"une aide dans un but de guerre."
The Japanese note mentions the length of sojourn and
furnishing of coal and provisions at Dakar, at Nossi-Be
^
and in Indo-Chinese waters. The actual conclusions of
Japan were
:
1. Que sans incriminer la bonne foi du gouvernement frangais
il estime que ses ordres ont ete executes de fagon insuffisante
;
2. Que s'il a ete fait droit a ses observations apr&s, il est
facheux qu'une surveillance plus active n'ait pas permis d'en
tenir compte avant et de prevenir des actes qu'il tient pour des
violations de la neutralite.
The French reply to the Japanese complaint maintains
that there is no code of international law ; that tne procla-
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mation issued by France in the Spanish-American war in
1898 was the same as that issued in 1905 ; that the coaling
had been done outside territorial waters; that the sojourn
in the neighborhood of Nossi-Be had not involved any
violation of neutrality; that Indo-Chinese coasts have not
served as a base of operations; that Japan had acted in
the Philippines and Netherland Indies in a manner simi-
lar to that of Russia in Indo-Chinese waters; that the
protest of Japan against France would be equally valid
against Great Britain and the powers, and that in Eng-
land Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Balfour had expressed
approval of the attitude taken by France.
A recent French viewT is as follows
:
II y a la, crojons-nous, une exaggeration critiquable au point de
vue du Droit international et dangereuse au point de vue pratique.
Depuis que la navigation a, vapeur s'est substitute a la navigation
a. voiles, le charbon est devenu un agent necessaire a la marche
des navires ; le fournir aux belligerants, ce n'est done pas leur
donner directement le moyen de combattre, mais celui de navi-
guer, et on ne coniprend pas plus qu'on le leur refuse, qu'on ne
leur refusait autrefois la toile dont ils avaient besoin pour
reparer leur voilure. Sinon, la logique commanderait de defendre
a un navire belligerant de se ravitailler en vivres, de ne pas
reparer ses avaries de machine dans un port neutre, car cela
aussi lui permet de continuer sa navigation tout comme une
fourniture de charbon. L'Etat neutre ne peut faire lui-meme
cette fourniture. parce qu'il violerait sa neutrality en mettant a
la disposition des belligerants les ressources de ses depots de
charbon qui ne sont pas destines a. la vente, mais a son propre
service militaire, et qu'il les detournerait ainsi de leur affectation
normale pour en faire profiter des belligerants. Mais, nous 1'avons
vu, l'Etat n'a pas a, empecher les actes de commerce faits avec les
belligerants par les particuliers : ceux-ci vendent leur charbon a
un navire belligerant comme ils le vendraient a tout batiment
national ou etranger. (Despagnet, Cours de droit international
public, 3d ed., p. 812.)
'
'
General drift tmcard restriction.—The policy of re-
striction in furnishing coal and other supplies to a bel-
ligerent war vessel in a neutral port has been in the direc-
tion of limiting such supplies to those necessary for the
immediate needs of navigation. While restrictions do
not in general begin to appear until the period of the
American civil war, since that time the policy has rapidly
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spread. By the end of the nineteenth century in the
Spanish-American war, the policy of restriction had be-
come common. In the Russo-Japanese war it was very
general. France was a marEeoT instance of the lack of
restriction on the supply of coal, though several other
states made no restrictions.
The unrestricted supply of coal within a neutral port
may lead to serious complications and may be greatly to
the disadvantage of the neutral permitting the act. The
belligerent thus supplied may use the coal in seeking out
and making prize of vessels of the neutral which has per-
mitted the supply to be taken in its ports. The belliger-
ent may agree not to capture vessels belonging to the
neutral which allows the coaling, but if it preys on the
commerce of another neutral the case may be equally dis-
advantageous. There may be complications between the
two neutrals in consequence.
The Unite_d States in June, 1905, took action upon the
entrance of the Russian Admiral Enquist with his vessels
into the port of Manila. Secretary Taftxm June 5, 1905,
sent instructions to Governor Wright at Manila as rol-
lows
:
Advise Russian admiral that as his ships are suffering from
damages due to battle, and our policy is to restrict all operations
of belligerents in neutral ports, the President can not consent to
any repairs unless the ships are interned at Manila until the
close of hostilities. You are directed after notifj'ing the Russian
admiral in this conclusion, to turn over the execution of this
order to Admiral Train, who has been advised accordingly, by
the Secretary of the Navy.
On the following day the Government gave out the
account of the matter.
The Secretary of War is in receipt of a cablegram from Gov-
ernor Wright announcing that Secretary Taft's instructions of
yesterday had been formally transmitted to the Russian admiral,
and at the same time inquiry was made whether he would be
required to put to sea within twenty-four hours after taking on
coal and provisions sufficient to take them to the nearest port.
That up to this time only enough coal and sufficient food supplies
for use in harbor to last from day to day had been given, as they
arrived in Manila with practically no coal or provisions. Gov-
ernor Wright submitted the question as to whether they were
jil
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entitled to take on coal and provisions to carry them to the
nearest port. Governor Wright was advised that the President
directed that the twenty-four hours limit must be strictly en-
forced ; that necessary supplies and coal must be taken on within
that time, these instructions being consistent with those of June
5, stating that as the Russian admiral's ships were suffering
from damages due to battle the American policy was to restrict
all operations of belligerents at neutral ports—in other words,
that time should not be given for repairs of damages suffered in
battle.
JDe Lapradelle entitles an article in 1904 "La nouvelle
these du refus de charbon anx belligerants dans les eaux
neutres."
The proposition to limit the supply to the amount
necessary to take the ship to the nearest port of her home
country, which has been a form often used and was that
approved by the Institute of International Law in 1898,
leaves much to be desired. The nearest port may not be
in the direction in which the vessel may be voyaging, or
if it is it may not be a port suitable for the entrance of
such a vessel. The gradual change in recent years has
shown that this formula is not sufficient. Such words as
the following have been added in certain proclamations:
"Or to some nearer neutral destination," "or to some nearer
named neutral destination," or that coal shall not be sup-
plied to "a belligerent fleet proceeding either to the seat
of war or to any position or positions on the line of route
Avith the object of intercepting neutral ships on suspicion
of carrying contraband of war."
In most declarations there has been a provision against
allowing a neutral port to become a base for equipping a
belligerent's vessel with coal, oil, or other supplies. By
"base," as thus used, is meant a place to which the vessel
frequently returns. The idea of "frequent," as thus used,
is generally covered by the prohibition against taking a
new supply of coal from the same neutral port till after
the expiration of a period of three months. Some states,
however, allow such supply within three months provided
permission is obtained from the proper authority.
It would seem to be evident that while the supplying of
coal to a belligerent is not prohibited by international law
though it has been prohibited in many proclamations, yet
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the supplying of coal at such frequent intervals as would
make the neutral port a base is generally regarded as pro-
hibited by international law, as is practically admitted in
the reply of France to Japan in 1905.
It seems to be the general opinion that the supply of
fuel, etc., to belligerents should be somewhat restricted in
neutral ports.
There are differences of opinion as to the extent of
necessary restrictions. Doubtless there would be need of
special restriction in special cases. Some degree of free-
dom should remain to the neutral in making provisions
for special conditions. It would seem reasonable that the
neutral should not afford a greater supply of coal* or oil
even for lubricating purposes than an amount sufficient to
carry the vessel to the home port. The purpose is to
guard against the furnishing of supplies for hostile uses
and at the same time not to intern a vessel of a belliger-
ent which may enter a neutral port. It would probably
be desirable to restrict the supply of oil for purposes of
fuel which would be included under the general head of
fuel and for lubricating purposes which makes necessary
specific mention of oil.
Considering opinions, precedents, practice and the aims
of a regulation, the following seems a reasonable con-
clusion :
Conclusion.—The supply of fuel or oil within a neutral
port to vessels in belligerent service in no case shall ex-
ceed what is necessary to make the total amount on board
sufficient to reach the nearest unblockaded port of the
belligerent vessel's own state or some nearer named desti-
nation.
The supply may be subject to such other regulation as
the neutral may deem expedient.
